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IT HAs been said that "law and econoniics are ever and everywhere
complementary and mutually determinative, like form and content.",
This idea was more general in the eighteenth century, when a composite
social theory was the object of writers on philosophy and law. So we
find discussions of the function of money in the works of such juristic
writers as Pufendorf, Grotius, and Montesquieu, a compound theory of
political economy and jurisprudence in Adam Smith, and a derivation
of justice in Hume's philosophy from the same scarcity of means and
ends which is the fundamental postulate of modern economics.2 But
since then the social studies have become extensively departmentalized
and, while it is easy to see that the economics of society and the lav of
society cover the same social material, it is much more difficult to find
any connection between economic and legal theory.
The two studies proceed from different sets of postulates, and the
divergences of their theories are in part due to this. But there is also a
difference of method between the two which has had important conse-
quences in influencing the trend towards their separation. The economist
proceeds by analysis of the concepts of his science, tentative hypotheses
whose utility is tested by a statistical examination of the conclusions
deduced from them.3 In law there has been a similar analysis of juristic
concepts, but the realistic studies comprise the practical examination and
decision of cases. Since every case concerns a particular dispute over
a particular issue between individuals, the decision depends on whether
the set of facts comes within one legal category or another. The cumu-
lative effect of the flow of cases is to establish the limits of these cate-
gories. The contrast with the economic method is then that a legal concept
is definable only by reference to the limits established by case law, but.
an economic conception is definable at the will of each economist (per-
haps it should be added, with the concurrence of his fellows). To take
an example: the law of contract contains the concepts of offer and
acceptance and the content of these can be determined only by an exam-'
ination of the limiting cases decided in the courts.. But an economic
concept such as rent or price is defined abstractly, its definition varying
from economist to economist even where there is a substantial measure
tFellow of University College, Oxford.
1. BEOLZHEImEm, THE WoRLD's LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (1912) 22, 23.
2. Cooke,.Adam Smith and Jurisprudece (1935) 51 L. Q. REV. 326.
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of common agreement; there is no limitation from the particulars of
real instances.
One English economist of the nineteenth century suggested that law,
in its bearings on the operation of the economic function in society, is
a subject demanding the economist's investigation.4 And some attempts
have been made to incorporate the legal principles on which the economic
system works in an economic theory of that system.5 But it is not unfair
to say that the link between economics and law is generally conceived
by economists to be the relation between a mechanism and its.direction;
law is the operative mechanism by which economic policy works. Its
most extreme form is exemplified by the Marxist theory of law as the
medium of control used by the dominant class. And although statutes
may express the economic policies of dominant classes, nevertheless the
application of these statutes is subject, at least in the United States
and Britain, to legal theory rooted in the continuity of the social system.
Law is certainly a mechanism, a mechanism for the settlement of dis-
putes and a mechanism of social control, but it derives more directive
force from legal doctrine than from any other source. It follows that
economic criticism of law must, to be valid, take these doctrines into
account, and that a criticism based on economic analysis from economic
postulates can have no direct relevance to the legal problem save by
way of helping to define the objectives which the legal solution should
approximate if it can.
This is not to say that the law contains all the economic doctrine it
needs. It does not,. as, for instance, the cases on restraint of trade show.
But it does mean that the economic content of legal doctrine can only
be increased by the assimilation of economic principles drawn from
postulates common to both economics and law. In these days of special-
ization this is much easier said than done. Yet it does not involve the
abandonment of existing economic theory and the immensely valuable
contributions it has made to social thought and social progress. The
combination of economics with law is more likely to come from the
exploration of case law by economists, because the concrete problems
of particular sets of facts are all that is really needed to bring about an
approximation of legal and economic definition. Both law and economics
would benefit by such explorations. The few economic studies of con-
ceptions common to law and economics indicate to what an extent the
economic ideas used in law are inconsistent and even incoherent.' And
there are unrealistic ideas in many fields of economic thought which the
4. LESLIE, ESSAYS ix POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1879) 404.
5. Notably in CommoNs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPTALs.! (1924).
6. See ROBSoN, LEGAL. CoxcEPioNs OF CAPITAL AND Izco.xr, Lou;0i ESSAYS nr
EcoNo ncs (1928) 251; Cooke, Legal Ride and Economic Fiunction (1936) 46 Ecour.
J. 21.
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concrete problems of case law might break down into forms perhaps
less general but much closer to experience, and more uniformly described.
One of the difficulties which meets a cour endeavoring to discover the
content of an economic concept for legal purposes is the conflict of views
among economists.1
This difficulty of definitions is conspicuous in the economic and legal
thought on profit, a conception, it need hardly be added, which lies at
the basis of the economic structure of England and America. But in spite
of the fact that in most modern communities economic enterprise is in
part at least the function of private profit derived from private property,
there is disagreement among economists on the nature and analysis of
profit and there is corresponding difficulty in the courts in interpreting
the word. It is not proposed in the present article to attempt any dis-
cussion of the various economic theories .of profit.' Its aim is an ex-
amination of some -art of the extensive case law dealing with profits
in order that some economic assessment of the content of profit as a
practical legal conception may be attempted.
An English judge once complained' that he could find no simple defi-
nition of profit that would fit all cases, though he leaned towards a
definition given in Marshall's Principles of Economics. This definition
runs as follows: "When a man is engaged in business, his profits for
the year are the excess of his receipts from his business during the year
over his outlay for his business; the difference between the value of his
stock and plant at the end and at the beginning of the year being taken
as part of his receipts or as part of his outlay, according as there has
been an increase or decrease of value."' 0 In other words the business
has a certain value at the beginning of the year. At the end of the year
there have been increases and decreases in the items making up this
value, and the difference between the old value and the new represents
the profit (or loss) of the business for the year. From another point
of view the purpose of a business is to generate an income for its owners,
who have contributed the fund necessary for its operation. Assuming
no further contributions to this fund by the owners, the annual profit
is the increase in this fund produced by the operation of the business
in each year. It is the analysis of this increase that the courts have
found difficult. Distinctions between capital, gross income and net in-
7. See Parry, Economic Theories in English Case Law (1931) 47 L. Q. RFv. 183,
and cases there cited at 191, 192.
8. The literature is so extensive that it may be useful to cite three discussions of
a number of economic theories of profit: KNIGHT, RiSm, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
(1920) c. II and IX; CANNAx, A REviEv oF EcoNomic THEORY (1929) c. X, §4;
DOB, CAPI TALIST ENTERPRISE AND SOCrAL PROGRESS (1925) c. V and VI.
9. Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 353, 366.
10. (1st ed. 1890) 142. A similar but not identical wording is in the 8th edition
at p. 74.
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come have arisen, and it is significant that the judge who cited Mar-
shall's definition of profit with approval found himself unable to use
it in law because he was encumbered with cases in which much had
been made of the difference between fixed and circulating capital.
There are two series of cases in which profits, capital, and income
have been debated. The first arises under the statutes relating to joiit
stock companies, and the second under the Income Tax Acts. The two
main problems which these cases consider are what constitutes profit
for the purposes of paying dividends and what constitutes profit for
purposes of taxation. There is some overlapping of the doctrines de-
rived from the resolving of these two problems, but it is convenient
to deal with the evolution of each separately, although reference to
the other will be occasionally necessary.
Taking company dividends first, it is familiar doctrine that dividends
can be paid only out of profits,-u but there is no clear definition of what
constitutes profits in company legislation. There was appended to the
Companies Act, 1862,"2 a schedule of regulations for the management
of companies which provided that the directors should lay before the
company at least once a year a statement of the income and expenditure
for the past year. "The statement so made shall show, under the most
convenient heads, the amount of gross income, distinguishing the several
sources from which it has been derived, and the amount of gross ex-
penditure, distinguishing the expense of the establishment, salaries and
other like matters. Every item of expenditure fairly chargeable against
the year's income shall be brought into account, so that a just balance
of profit and loss may be laid before the meeting." 13 The conclusion
that profit is thus gross income, less the expenditure chargeable against
the year's income, requires the elucidation of what constitutes gross
income and what is expenditure chargeable against it. These two prob-
lems fall naturally into the two avenues of interpretation: income into
company law, where division of the income is the source of litigation,
and expenditure chargeable against income into income tax law, where
the litigant is concerned about the size of an assessed income.
It has been held that where a company has sold part of its capital
assets at a profit, with the result that the total value of these assets
exceeds its paid-up capital, the excess may be treated as part of the
company's gross income and carried to profit and loss account.' Again,
11. See 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, Table A, Clause 73 (1862) ; Evans v. Coventry, 25 L. J.
Ch. 489 (1856); Rance's Case, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 104 (1870); Guinness v. Land Corp.
of Ireland, 22 Ch. D. 349 (1882).
12. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, Table A (1862).
13. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, 1st Schedule, Clause 80 (1862).
14. Lubbock v. British Bank of South America, [1892] 2 Ch. 193; Foster v. Nev
Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., [1901] 1 Ch. 20. See also In re National Bank of Vales,
Ltd., [1899] 2 Ch. 629.
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it was held as far back as 1869 that where a company estimates that
it has made a profit it need not actually wait to realize all its assets to
ascertain whether a profit has actually been made,,but may pay a dividend
on the basis of its estimation.r Hence if a company estimates that its
capital assets have increased in value during a year the increase may
be treated as a contribution to gross income, although there is some doubt
as to whether dividends may be paid from this source alone.10 The
rule of practice seems to be that if the capital remains in the balance
sheet at levels of previous years and the profit and loss account shows
a profit, including these sources of gross income, then that is a true
profit for dividend purposes.17 This echoes the simple statement in an
early case, that profit "is the amount got from the property minus the
cost of getting it.""8 A difficult problem, however, may be found in
the question whether, when there has been a fall in the capital assets
of a company, this fall is part of the cost of getting profit. Has a com-
pany to meet losses of capital, or depreciation, of its assets before it
can arrive at a true profit?
The first answer in English law was that, as a dividend could be paid
only out of profits and could not be paid out of capital, the capital must
be it its established level before profits for dividend purposes appeared.
In Davison v. Gillies'0 a company was restrained from paying a dividend
because its stock was depreciated, in spite of the existence of a surplus
on profit and loss account. And in Dent v., London Tramways it was
said that dividends were payable from the "profits for the year," which
meant the surplus of receipts after paying expenses and restoring the
capital to its level at the beginning of the year.20 Hence the accounting
period must be regarded as closed at both ends. There may be a loss
on the balance sheet and a consequent fall in capital assets in one period,
but if there are profits in a later year it is the position of the capital
assets on the first day of that later year that is considered. The previous
fall is of no legal account and does not diminish later profits.
Some .years later it was decided in the Court of Appeal that where
a company was formed to work a wasting asset, such as a mine, and
its articles of association stated that it was not necessary to provide
for the depreciation of the mine, there was nothing in the Companies
15. Stringer's Case, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 475 (1869).
16. Ia re Spanish Prospecting Co., Ltd., [1911] 1 Ch. 92; Ammonia Soda Co. v.
Chamberlain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266. Contra: Wall v. London and Provincial Trust, Ltd.,
[1920] 1 Ch. 45.
17. See GoRE-BRowN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIEs (38th ed.) 476;
DEPAuLA, P~aNcwrs oF AUDITING (8th ed.) 190.
18. Jessel, M. R., in Erichsen v. Last, 51 Q. B. D. 86 (1881).
19. 16 Ch. D. 347 (1879).
20. 16 Ch. D. 344, 354 (1880).
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Acts to compel it to do So.21- Hence the Companies Acts were held not
to compel the replacement of lost capital before arriving at profit; sub-
sequently this decision was reiterated,22 but qualified in the important
case of Verner v. General and Commercial Investment Trust.? Here a
company was formed to invest in securities and it was held that, in
spite of the fact that its holdings had depreciated, the company could
declare a dividend out of the surplus shown in its profit and loss ac-
count. Lindley, L. J., said that the legal rule is not that dividends can
be paid only out of profits, but that they cannot be paid out of the
shareholders' capital. They can, therefore, be paid out of a profit and
loss account without providing for losses of capital on the previous
balance sheet.
Thereafter, however, a distinction was developed between fixed and
circulating or floating capital, a distinction which seems to have drifted
into the law2  from the economic theory of the second half of the nine-
teenth century.' The permanent (shareholders') capital lost in any
year need not be made good in subsequent years before the declaration
of a dividend. But where the capital used up in the business (such as
stocks or raw materials) depreciated in the accounting year, this depre-
ciation is a loss to set against gross profit. "Perhaps the shortest way
of expressing the distinction is to say that fixed capital may be sunk
and lost, and yet that the excess of current receipts over current pay-
ments may be divided, but that floating or circulating capital must be
kept up, as otherwise it -will enter into and form part of such excess,
in which case to divide such excess without deducting the capital which
forms part of it will be contrary to law." 20 On the basis of this dis-
tinction it was held in several later cases that dividends could be de-
clared without providing for the depredation of fixed assets.-
There was some amplification of the point in the National Bank of
Wales case. 8 The bank had paid certain dividends in spite of the fact
that it was treating as good certain debts which it knew to be bad. Should
this certain loss be set against gross profit or could it be treated as a loss
of fixed assets in the balance sheet? It was held in the Court of Appear
21. Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., 41 ClI. D. 1 (18S9).
22. Bolton v. Natal Land and Colonization Co. [1892] 2 Ch. 124.
23. [1894] 2 Ch. 239.
24. See RonsoN, LoND ON EssAYs m EcoNo ics (1928) 260.
25. See Ini., PPINCIPLEs or POLT"ICAL EcoNon'y (ed. Ashley 1923) 91:
26. Lindley, L. J., in Verner v. General and Commercial Trust [1S94] 2 Ch. 239,
at 266.
27. Wilmer v. McNamara & Co., Ltd. (1895] 2 CI. 245; It¢ re Kingston Cotton Mill
Co. [1896] 1 Ch. 331; Bosanquet v. St. John D&I Rey fining Co., 77 L. T. 206
(Ch. D. 1897).
28. [1899] 2 Ch. 629.
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that the court will not interfere to prevent losses being charged to capital,
except where they are obviously chargeable to profit and loss, the matter
being one to be decided by business practice in the trade concerned. 2 But
when the case went to the House of Lords,3" the Law Lords did not
expressly agree with the propositions of the Court of Appeal on fixed
and circulating capital. The case was decided on a .different point and
the House was inclined, so far as it committed itself, to doubt whether
a company, which has made a definite loss of fixed capital, may have a
profit for dividend purposes until that loss has been provided for.
Although it is more than thirty years since the House of Lords thus
reserved its decision on the relation of profit to capital losses, the oc-
casion has not yet offered itself for a final statement of English law
on the point. The Court of Appeal has continued to decide cases on the
basis that a company can pay dividends on its profits even though it has
lost part of its capital assets.3 ' And, indeed, it seerris that the profits of
a particular year may be treated as profits for dividend purposes without
first making good losses of previous years on the profit and loss ac-
count.3" The doctrine of fixed and circulating capital has also been car-
ried even further, but as Scrutton, L. J., has said, all the distinction seems
to mean at present is that dividends must be paid out of net and not out
of gross profits.8 3
There is in the Income Tax Acts no guidance on the issue of what
constitutes "profits". The amount to be assessed is "the balance of the
profits or gains," and a series of provisions limit the deductions that
may be made in arriving at this balance. A long series of cases has
established the rule, that the assessed balance must be computed by
ordinary commercial principles, "by setting against the income earned
the cost of earning it, subject to the limitations prescribed by the Act."-4
In general, the proper debit items in a trading or.a profit and loss account
are the only proper debit items in computing income tax.35 But an im-
portant exception is that determining the allowance for depredation of
•plant; depreciation is a deduction from assessable profits, even though
not a deduction made in the course of computing profits. Thus it has
29. Id. at 669, 670.
30. Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A. C. 477.
31. Bond v. Barrow Haematite Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 353; Ammonia Soda Co. V.
Chamberlain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266.
32. Stapley v. Read Bros., 131 L. T. 629 (Ch. D. 1924).
33. Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266, at 298.
34. Lord Loreburn in Usher's Wiltshire Brevery, Ltd. v. Bruce, [1915] A. C.
433, 444. °
35. A list of cases and authoritative statement of the law governing the computation
of trading profits for income tax purposes is contained in the Report of the Income
Tax Codification Committee, 1936, vol. 1, pp. 48-51.
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been held that the profits of a company whose capital was intact were
merely its gross profits, for the purposes of taxation because no allow-
ance had yet been made to meet depreciation of capital."
This exception of depreciation is one of taxation procedure only,
existing in order that the deduction of depreciation may be controlled.
It is plain that the depreciation of plant is part of the cost of obtaining
income from the plant, and, indeed, the fact has been recognized in law.
It has been held that a person who is entitled under a deed to the profits
of a business is entitled only to the profits after sums have been set aside
for depreciation of machinery.17 True profit in the income tax classifica-
tion is, therefore, not the assessable, but the taxable profit, that is to say,
the assessable profit less the allowance for depreciation. But it is not
safe to push these conceptions drawn from taxation law too far, because
they vary in an important particular from the business aspect of profit.
From the point of view of taxation the analysis of profit is the separation
of the income generated by a capital fund from the fund itself."3 And
until there is evidence that a company intends to convert its accumulated
profits into capital, they remain profits and the capital constante0 Such
a conversion was held effected in lidand Revenue Conzissioners v.
Blott 0 by the issuance of bonus shares, such shares coming to the stock-
holders as capital and not as income.
This legal separation of income from capital is common ground in
English and American law. Thus the Law Lords forming the majority
in Blott's case all referred with respect to the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Eisner v. Macomber.4' In a later English
case Sankey, J., carried further the analysis of Pitney, J., in Eisner v.
Mllacomber. Here' an English investment company received in respect
of shares which it held in an American company an extra dividend out
of the accumulated profits of that company consisting partly of cash
and partly of common stock in another American company. The English
company sold the stock, and the case concerned its liability to income tax
on the proceeds of the sale; that is, had there been a distribution of
36. Davidson v. Commissioner of Taxes, [1917] A. C. (P. ca) 542.
37. Re Crabtree, 106 L. T. 49 (Ct. App. 1912).
38. Cf. the cases concerning the interests of life tenants and remaindermen. See
also Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385 (1837); Strachan, A Companys' Capital or
Income (1930) 46 L. Q. Rnv. 334.
39. See Fry, L. J., in Sproule v. Bouch, 29 Ch. D. 635, at 655 (185) "Profits
appear to us to retain their character of income till they are converted into capital."
See also It re Bridgewater Navigation Co., [1891] 2 Ch. 317; In re Spanish Prospect-
ing Co., Ltd., [1911] 1 Ch. 92; and It re Thomas, [1916] 2 Ch. 331.
40. [1921] 2 A. C. 171.
41. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Seligman, Effects of the Sloth Divdend Decision (1921)
21 Coc. L. REv. 313.
42. Pool v. Guardian Investment Trust Co., Lt& [1922]" 1 K. B. 347.
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capital or of income? Mr. Justice Sankey said that in his view the
distinction depended on two points: (1) whether there had been a re-
lease of assets; (2) if so, whether the assets released were capital or
income. From Eisner v. Macomber he drew the principle that mere
growth or increment in value of a capital investment is not per se in-
come; but that "income is essentially a gain or profit in itself of ex-
changeable value, proceeding from capital, severed from it and received
by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit and disposal."43 A stock
dividend in shares of the company making the dividend is merely a
transfer of an accumulated surplus to the capital account of the corpora-
tion; or as was said in Blbtt's case: "from the reservoir of capital certain
proceeds were allowed to flow down the outlet stream, but these pro-
ceeds were not allowed to reach the shareholder. The company enlarged
the area of the reservoir and put back the proceeds into the enlarged
reservoir; in other words, the proceeds in that case never became the
profit or gain or income of the shareholder, but were put back into the
capital of the company." '44 In Pool's case the outward flow reached the
shareholder (a) in cash and (b) ii specie of the shares of another com-
pany. There was then a complete severance of income from the capital
of the company paying the dividend, the recipient receiving it entirely
for his own use, benefit, and disposal. As it was put in Eisner v.
Macomber, the essential matter is "not a gain accruing to capital, not a
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit,
something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed
from the capital however invested or employed.''41
The differentiation of capital and income reached in these cases is
also a differentiation of profit and the earnings of capital. The company
is a going concern in which the stockholder has an interest. It was held
many years ago that the legal interest of all the stock is in the company,
who afe trustees for the members.4" The modern view is rather that
the shareholders each hold a fraction of the totality of ownership of
the business clothed with legal form by the corporation. But the essential
point is the separation of the business from the shareholders and of the
profit of the business from the dividend income of the shareholders. A
fraction of ownership is not a fraction of the business, and the share-
holder's interest appertains to the entire business. As to the assets, which
are a part only of the business, the company is the sole owner, having
full title, legal and equitable, to the whole. When the company makes
43. Id. at 358.
44. Id. at 359.
45. 252 U. S. 189, at 207 (1919). (Italicized as cited).
46. Child v. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Wins. 207 (Ch. 1723).
47. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 208 (1919).
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profits, these add to the fund which constitutes the business. But unless
and until the directors decide to sever part of this fund from the business
and divide it amongst the shareholders, passing to them the complete
property in each fraction, the shareholder has no certain claim against
the going concern for a share in the assets.
American interpretation of the rule that dividends can be paid only
out of prbfits and must not impair capital has developed strongly this
idea that a dividend is a severance of assets. And in.spite of some ap-
parent contradictions4" the theory contains a coherent conception of profit.
It is said that the profit of a corporation is the incre.se in the net worth
of the corporation over a given period, namely the periodic variations to
be found in the sum which is computed by adding the capital stock to
the surplus. But increases in this "net worth" can be reflected only in
variations in the surplus account, since the capital stock is a constant
and must necessarily so remain. Therefore, any discussion or determina-
tion of the existence of increases in net worth (i.e. profit) must be
made in view of changes in surplus. That fund represents the difference
between assets and liabilities; the declaration of a dividend reduces it
by vesting an addition to the liabilities. However, the mere existence
of a surplus does not imply that there is a fund available for immediate
dividends. For, the surplus of assets over liabilities fepresents an in-
crease at the time of ascertainment in the capital of the business in the
sense of the fund of assets on which business operation is based, and
that increase may not be in a form available for dividend distribution.
Unless this capital is sufficient to satisfy all liabilities including the return
of the subscriptions to capital stock in case of a dissolution, and in ad-
dition leave an excess, then only has a profit been made--because the
capital fund has increased. Clearly, there can be no such profit unless
the original capital (plus interim additions to it) is intact. And if any
of the assets in which the capital is invested are wasting assets or are
consumed as revenue is earned, the wastage and consumption must be
made good before a profit can appear.40
American legal doctrine defines "profit" for the purposes of corporate
dividend payments in a manner most nearly approximating the prevail-
ing economic analyses of the concept. It is the one that comes closest
to bridging the gap between economics and law in so far as it reggar. 5
48. Weiner, Anglo-American Dividend Law (1929) 29 Cor. L. Rsv. .461, (1930)
30 CoL L R-v. 330. See also REmER, PaoFrx"s, Draa/ENDS AM THE LAw (1926);
MAGmrL, TA-XABLE IrcomE (1936) Ch. 2, pp. 41-50.
49. Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 AUt. 48
(Ch. 1936), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch. 409, 138 At. 347 (Ch. 1927), (1927) 40 HAv. L. R'V.
318; (1926) 75 U. or PA. L. Rsv. 89; cf. DrPAuLA, op. cit. mspra note 17, at 69. The
situation may be different, however, where only stockholders of one class or preference
are involved in the controversy. See Legis. (1928) 28 Cor.. L. REv. 232.
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all the assets of a corporation as its capital-the fund, that is, with which
the business is conducted-and determines the existence of profit only
by increases in that fund as a whole over its original size whether at
the beginning of the accounting period or at the inception of the business.
The English doctrine, it appears, has unfortunately, not taken the same
course-at least if we are to take the words of the Court of Appeal
literally.
Thfee cases may be .cited in conclusion as showing that the truth of
the matter was in English law some years ago and that there is probably
a much closer correspondence between English and American law than
the Court of Appeal would have us believe. In 1882 Lord Shand said:
"In order to ascertain the profits earned and divisible at any given time,
the balance sheet must contain a fair statement of the liabilities of the
company, including its paid up capital, and on the other hand a fair
or more properly a bona fide valuation of assets, the balance if in favor
of the company being profits.""0 Ten years later Mr. Justice Chitty
stated: "I have before me the defendant (banking) company's accounts
up to December, 1890. Theyput down on the one side their liabilities,
treating properly the £500,000, which has been subscribed by the share-
holders, as a liability, for the purposes of bringing it into account, as
against the assets which they put down on the other side. Then on the
same liabiliW side they properly put their current liabilities, and certain
other liabilities and reserve fund, which the company, according to its
constitution, is justified in making, and they add up the total amount of
those liabilities. On the other side they put down their assets, and for
the purpose of giving information to the shareholders, they divide the.
assets into certain heads . . and then they add up the total on
that side . . . They put down on the assets side the money value of
their assets, some being in money itself and some not. Then when the
two sides of this account are compared, there is a surplus . . . which
rightly goes to the profit and loss account.""' And in 1910 Lord Justice
Fletcher Moulton said: "Ve start . . . with this fundamental definition
of profits, namely, if the total assets of the business at the two dates be
compared, the increase they show at the later date as compared with the
earlier date (due allowance of course being made for any capital intro-
duced into or taken out of the business in the meanwhile) represents in
strictness he profits of the business during the period in question."'"
50. City of Glasgow Bank v. Mackinnon, 19 ScoT. L. REv. 278,,316 (1881).
51. Lubbock v. British Bank of South America, [1892] 2 Ch. 198, 200.
52. In re Spanish Prospecting Co., Ltd., [1911] 1 Ch. 92, 99.
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